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efforts of business elites associated with the China Entrepreneur's Club. Finally, it explores why these activist efforts are superseded in significance by government austerity measures.
The paper thus offers an empirically informed study of contemporary mediatized environmental communication (and conflict) as a product of the mutually constitutive, but often unpredictable, interactions between NGO-activism, media, industry and formal politics, which traverse the local, national and transnational to varying degrees (see Hutchins & Lester, 2015) .
The paper also raises the issue of "authoritarian environmentalism". The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a focus of debates on the relative merits of "democratic versus authoritarian environmentalism" because of its growing number of environmental organizations and comparatively rapid advances in legislation on environmental protection (Eaton & Kostka, 2014; Gilley, 2012 ). China's system of one-party rule has enabled the Party-state to ignore many pressing environmental issues and ensured that Chinese environmental organizations typically complement state goals of tackling (in politically nonconfronting ways) the environmental degradation that has accompanied rapid economic growth (Ho & Edmonds, 2012; Shapiro, 2012) . However, the Party-state also has the perceived capacity to implement significant environmental protection policies quickly because, unlike in western democracies, it does not have to cater to the interests of highconsuming citizens as voters, and can arguably override the interests of business groups that might be opposed to environmental action (Gilley, 2012, p. 288 ). This capacity is inadvertently highlighted by changing patterns of shark fin consumption associated with the recent introduction of government austerity measures in the PRC.
I conclude that translocal celebrity environmental activism in mainland China has missed its target, being heavily influenced by communication strategies used in international campaigns and providing incoherent local framing. In particular, efforts to reduce shark-fin consumption through changing individual discretionary behaviour overlook the considerable consumption associated with official largesse. Declining demand for shark fin associated with government austerity measures demonstrates claims that broader efforts to reduce corruption may have greater potential to influence patterns of luxury food consumption in China than environmental communication campaigns (Fabinyi, 2011, p. 89 ). 5 Environmental communication mediated through celebrities and corporate elites is an established, albeit controversial, practice in western societies (Boykoff & Goodman, 2009 ).
China's celebrities and shark protection
Supporters argue that leveraging "fame" helps to raise public awareness of environmental issues and organizations by generating media publicity, demystifying campaign issues, and attracting new audiences and sponsorship (United Nations Environmental Programme, n.d.).
Critics contend that mediatized celebrity-corporate activism refers to an elitist mode of social control that depoliticizes environmental issues by presenting non-experts delivering simplified messages as authoritative voices for complex issues, turning environmentalism into a fashion or fad, and sometimes encouraging the ongoing exploitation of the natural world through the consumption of cause-related products (Brockington, 2009; Goodman, 2013) .
These arguments have reduced explanatory capacity in the PRC-an emerging authoritarian superpower with a history of (failed) socialist experimentation, and recent rapid economic growth and social change. China's private entrepreneurs and celebrities do not comprise an established "power elite" as in western societies, that is, a networked group of non-elected, "non-state" actors who influence national and increasingly international government decision-making. Members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in positions of institutional authority comprised the only identifiable elite group in mainland China until the mid-1990s. After the PRC's founding in 1949, revolutionary politics ensured that imperialand Republican-era elite groups -rural gentry, urban capitalists and opposition political, military, religious and cultural figures -ceased to exist as significant agents of governance, drivers of economic enterprise, and formers of local opinion and values (Hassid & Jeffreys, 2015, p. 81) . Throughout the Mao era , curtailment of the monetary economy, nationalization of industry and agrarian land redistribution, prevented private enterprise and significant private wealth accumulation. Party control of the state-owned media also ensured that China's media chiefly communicated Party-state ideology and policies, and promoted revolutionary heroes and political figures as role models. A stratum of newly rich private entrepreneurs and entertainment celebrities has emerged along with the PRC's post-1978 policy of partially privatizing the economy and "opening up to the rest of the world", which gained momentum in the 1990s, and development of a semi-commercialized media (Hassid & Jeffreys, 2015, p. 82) . While China's financial and cultural elites have limited political 6 power, they sometimes influence public policy debates (Jeffreys, 2016) , as illustrated by shark-protection campaigns.
The most prominent celebrity spokesperson for shark conservation in both the USA and mainland China is Yao Ming, the Shanghai-born owner of the Chinese Basketball Association's Shanghai Sharks, and a retired star player with the American National Basketball Association (NBA). Yao appeals to multiple constituencies as a translocal celebrity. Ranked by Forbes Magazine as mainland China's richest celebrity for six consecutive years between 2004 (Yu, 2009 , the Washington Times once claimed that: "The Yao craze knows no limits to time, geography or media" (Oates & Polumbaum, 2004, p. 208 ).
Yao Ming is the celebrity face of a series of spectacular Public Service Advertisements (PSAs) produced by WildAid that aim to encourage individuals to become ethical consumers and save the world's oceans by refusing to eat shark-fin soup. Yao features in short, visually stunning videos that conclude with the message: "When the buying stops, the killing can too". The PSAs' narratives adopt some key principles of coherent framing -tell a story that "rouses emotions" and don't repeat any counter arguments (Lakoff, 2010, p. 79) . They imply that shark fin is the main reason for fishing sharks (which may not be the case), and that finning is the normal way of fishing sharks. They also use the highest figure provided by fisheries scientist Shelley Clarke (n.d.) , who estimates that between 26-73 million sharks are killed each year, while ignoring her comment that: "no one knows how many sharks are killed for their fins, how many have their carcasses dumped at sea, or how many sharks are alive when finned". (gymnast and sportswear tycoon) and Liu Huan (musician) also featured in conservation messages that were shown on the state-run China Central Television Station and cable networks such as National Geographic (Yao Ming, Li Ning, Liu Huan, deng, 2006 Chinese banquets honours the host and guests, or gives them "face"; (c) shark populations are being wiped out as a result; and (d) China and the Chinese people will "lose face" when that happens, so "don't eat shark fin soup!" (Guo Jingjing, 2010; Li Ting: Blink, 2010; Zhou Jihong: Duty, 2010) . The PSAs conclude with the WildAid tagline: "When the buying stops, the killing can too". They therefore combine activist messaging with appeals to national pride, suggesting through reference to Olympian sports stars that China's international reputation is more important than the forms of sociability associated with the eating of imperial cuisine. The PSAs arguably also offer an example of incoherent framing by triggering the notion that eating shark-fin soup is an important Chinese custom that "gives face" to individual hosts and guests in more localized contexts. This spectacular PSA offers an example of incoherent framing in mainland Chinese settings.
It activates "conventional habits" by framing the event as social banquet, but assumes that empathy with an edible animal naturally supersedes the social relations between host and guest. It ignores the possibility that pushing away the soup might imply an insult to the host, and hence may not only be a difficult action to perform, but also may have negative consequences in terms of continued family and/or work relationships. This incoherence is compounded by the inconsistency of the tagline (which equates "buying" to "killing") with the spectacle (which more contentiously equates "accepting hospitality" to "killing"). (Lin, 2011; Rogers, 2013) . Hailed as a victory against a "savage, barbaric practice" by pro-shark protection local politicians and conservation groups (Rider, 2013) , both bans faced court challenges as intrusive and discriminatory, for singling out a Chinese custom, rather than banning all shark products, and potentially giving authorities the power to enter homes on suspicion the soup was being served (Rider, 2013; Rogers, 2013) .
Although the Toronto ban was overturned, the Californian ban came into effect on 1 July 2013 (Rogers, 2013) . The European Union also agreed to ban shark finning on all vessels in EU waters and all EU registered vessels around the world on 6 June 2013 (Sullivan, 2013) .
Contradicting earlier reservations about Chinese political censorship, a 2013 story in The
Guardian claims instead that Yao Ming, as an "NBA giant", has ruined "small Chinese fish factories" by persuading Chinese youth to reject shark-fin dishes (Thibault, 2013) . The article cites the owners of two shark processing factories as saying: "Society is turning against us … because of all these articles in the press", "business is no longer good" because young people won't eat shark-fin dishes (Thibault, 2013) . One owner laments: "Our industry is pretty small and Yao Ming is highly respected, so the government doesn't support us" (Thibault, 2013) .
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These media-solicited claims imply the existence of defensive industry spokespersons attempting to counter the negative effects on industry of a successful activist campaign.
However, it is questionable whether Yao Ming's advocacy has led to a major decrease in sales of shark fin in mainland China, given the limited nature of broadcast media reportage it attracted. The dissemination of WildAid's campaign through social media may be helping to dissuade young adults in China from eating shark-fin dishes, but this assertion is hard to verify. As detailed below, it is more probable that any decline in sales of shark fin is The PSA engages coherent framing by linking environmental protection with issues of global risk and national pride, while arguably using the "wrong messengers" (Lakoff, 2010, p. 80) .
Business leaders are aspirational role models in the PRC, but "resentment" and "distrust" of the newly rich is common (Fabinyi, 2011, p. 88) . The PSA opens with the five CEOs sitting around a dining table, and asks: "When these business leaders come together, what do they talk about?" "We must plan for the future", says Li Dongsheng; "We must protect our assets", says Hu Baosen; "We must think globally and act locally", says Huang Nubo; "We must make the world proud of China", says Wei Xue. "We must protect our oceans by not eating shark fin", says Feng Lun (Shipin: Yesheng jiuyuan, 2012). The PSA concludes with the WildAid tagline, implying that those Chinese people who seek to be financially successful, patriotic, cosmopolitan, and acclaimed, are forward-thinking and not tradition-bound; they can save the world's oceans by choosing not to eat a dish once prepared for emperors.
The four men in the PSA are also members of the China Entrepreneur Club (CEC), which has advocated for shark conservation in China alongside WildAid and TNC since the late 2000s.
These connections highlight the recent emergence in China of translocal networks of elites aiming to mobilize human, institutional, material, and discursive resources into networks of action focused on the environment. Established in 2006, the CEC is a non-profit organization and elite social club that aims to provide a platform for "Chinese entrepreneurial exchange" and "international collaboration", and to promote "sustainable economic and social development" (About us, 2007) . In 2008, the CEC and China's Ocean University released a "shark fin nutrition report" stating that shark fin contains high levels of lead and mercury and has no nutritional or medicinal value ("Baohu shayu juchi yuchi", 2009). In January 2009, Zhang Xingsheng, a CEC member and Director of the North Asia region of TNC, started a conversation on China's Twitter-like Weibo, calling on the PRC's legislature to ban shark fin consumption. Zhang has over 1.6 million Weibo followers, but the shark conversation attracted less than 330 responses (Zhang, 2011) . controversy by announcing that patrons at his restaurants on the first day of the Chinese New Year holidays, 3 January 2012, would receive free shark-fin dishes until his stocks were gone. Some netizens described Shangguan as an admirable role model, while others accused him of engaging in a promotional stunt (Shangguan Junle jiesuo "gaodiao cishan", 2012) . Whichever the case may be, Shangguan posted a message on 9 January 2012 on Tencent's QQ, an online instant messaging service, calling on people to stop eating shark fin to protect the environment and their health, which was read by around 11,000 people .
Other local elites committed resources to the rollout of "Zero Shark Fin" initiatives in different cities across China in 2012. Green Beagle, Tencent, the CEC, and SEE, organized a petition, which was signed by more than 100 organizations, urging the Shenzhen Municipal Government to ban the sale of shark fin, and make Shenzhen China's first "Shark-Fin Free City" (Yang, 2012) . The petition stated that a ban would send an important message about China's commitment to environmental protection, given Shenzhen's proximity to Hong Kong -the major market for shark fin. In Changsha, the Head of the Hunan Food Industry told journalists that a ban was not relevant because the city had a limited market for shark fin.
However, some restaurateurs had indicated that they would follow Yao Ming and the CEC's lead (Yao & Shu, 2012) . In Zhanjiang, posts were placed on blogs, by individuals describing themselves as junior high-school students, calling for volunteers to hand out shark-protection leaflets in shopping malls (Szyhippo, 2013) . The failure of these efforts to attract visible support suggests that the environmental communication was fronted by the "wrong messengers" (Lakoff, 2010, p. 80 ). This views and multiple posts on other social media totalling over 360,000 views (Cheng, 2013;  Shipin: Kuailejiazu wo yu yuchi, n.d.). Many of these posts reiterate WildAid's celebrityendorsed narratives that "shark finning is brutal" and "eating shark fin is unhealthy".
However, others accuse the hosts of being "hypocritical" and "self-promoting" because "only rich people can eat such things". Yet others suggest that environmental communication should be located in government departments rather than targeting sites used by "ordinary citizens" (Spring-shine, 2013) .
However, WildAid's leveraging of Chinese business figures succeeded where it might have been most expected to fail: it brought the issue of shark fin consumption to the attention of the 2012 meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's so-called "rubber stamp" legislature (Truex, 2014) . The full congress of nearly 3,000 Party-selected but publicly "elected" members meets for around two weeks every year to vote through bills, the major content of which has already been decided by government departments and Party committee.
While members are expected to submit motions on alternative policies and increasingly do so, such motions seldom become policy (Jeffreys, 2016) .
In March 2012, Ding Liguo, a member of the CEC and SEE, submitted a motion to the NPC, which was drafted with the help of Zhang Xingsheng from TNC, recommending that relevant government departments set an international example of good practice by banning shark-fin soup at state-funded banquets (Yuan, 2012) (Kao, 2014) .
While WildAid (n.d.), the CEC and the WWF, attribute this drop to the success of their environmental communication and only secondarily or possibly to the government ban (Kao, 2014; Jin shi yuchi, 2012; Yuan, 2012) , the available evidence suggests otherwise. As Lakoff (2010, p. 77) laments, environmental action tends to focus on individual behavioural change rather than political action, when "[to] an enormous degree, governmental action outweighs and shapes individual actions". In this instance, the dramatic decline in demand for shark fin is attributable to government action that has only tangential links to environmental communication and authoritarian environmentalism.
Government austerity and shark protection
The cause of shark conservation in mainland China was unexpectedly boosted in December Other media reports indicate that the austerity measures have reduced demand for imported goods such as Australian wine (Greenblat, 2014) and altered luxury consumption and business practices across the country. For example, in March 2013, the Emperor Shark Fin Restaurant in Jinan City changed its name and cut the number of luxury items on its menu, while increasing its standard-priced dishes, to attract patronage and compensate for reduced custom from local government officials (Li, 2013) . Taxi drivers in Dunhuang, a "silk road" tourism destination, told the author of this paper that the city's luxury hotel, restaurant and wine business had declined along with reduced custom from government officials attending "conferences". But "farmhouse accommodations" providing "local food and beer" were booming as government officials altered their expectations and spending patterns to conform to government policy (Personal conversations, September 2013).
These changes have been widely publicized in China's media. A search for the keywords "shark fin" (鱼翅) and "austerity" (勤俭节约) on CNKI obtained 74 hits for the two-year period between 1 January and 31 December 2014 (cnki.net, 4 February 2015 . This figure points to the publicity success of the government action when compared to NGO action, being more than double the number of mentions that "Yao Ming" and "shark fin" the PSAs' evocation of banqueting and associated social relations arguably involves incoherent framing in the mainland Chinese context insofar as it misrepresents the choices available, culturally, to recipients of hospitality. Shark-fin consumption in China is rarely framed at an individual level; and, the main purchasers of shark-fin products are older than the target audience of celebrity-endorsed environmental campaigns, being the parents of young adults who are getting married and having expensive celebratory banquets, or people with sufficient access to organizational resources to afford prestige-giving banquets. More generally, the framing may lack effectiveness because the majority of young adults in mainland China have never seen an ocean, and are unlikely to purchase an expensive item such as shark fin in the first place.
In contrast, the austerity measures directly affect the behaviour of government elites whose luxury consumption is driven by the need to build intra-government, intra-Party and business relationships to achieve personal success, and by the availability of public funds. Unlike the WildAid efforts, these messages had an almost instant effect. The explicit (and credible) threat of being publicly exposed and punished for failing to constrain acts of conspicuous consumption has proved far more effective than NGO-led efforts in moral persuasion targeting affluent young adults. This success demonstrates that efforts to reduce corruption have greater capacity to influence patterns of luxury food consumption in China than environmental communication campaigns.
19
Despite their comparative failure, celebrity-endorsed shark conservation campaigns highlight the potential for environmental NGOs and elite syndicates to effect social change in China.
These latter organizations managed to persuade national and local elites to rollout sharkprotection campaigns across multiple cities. The scale of that enterprise shows how NGOand elite-led communicative activism can be self-reinforcing, leading one group of organizations and elites to inspire other groups to undertake similar activities, regardless of national boundaries. This suggests that celebrity and corporate activism could possibly be a significant force for social change in China, given the limited spaces available for broader political participation in that country. Such activism may ensure that financial and cultural elites do not resurrect the demand for shark fin by providing it at corporate-funded dinners to court "favours" from government officials. However, in order for international environmental activism to be more significantly successful, the use of spectacular communication practice based on "western" models clearly needs refining. It not only matters how we frame the environment and sharks, but also how we understand the environment of human action in different cultural contexts.
